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Introduction

The Chinese Revolution of 1944-49 resulted in the liberation of a quarter of the world's population from the shackles of landlord and capitalist rule. The victory of Mao Tse-tung's Red Army not only meant the completion of a thorough-going agrarian revolution, with the land passing into the hands of the peasants. It also led inevitably to the nationalisation of industry, finance and trade, and the establishment of a planned economy.

This was despite the programme of Mao, and the declared intention of all the Chinese Communist Party and Red Army leaders, that Chinese capitalism would be kept alive and encouraged to enjoy a long period of development.

In fact, the outcome of the Chinese Revolution confirmed the perspective of Trotsky, who had written in 1928: "...the third Chinese revolution ... will be compelled from the very outset to effect the most decisive shake-up and abolition of bourgeois property in city and village." (See *INQABA Supplement No. 7*, p. 7.)

But Trotsky, like all the great Marxist teachers in the past, considered that such a *social revolution* could only be carried through by the working class, and under conscious working-class leadership. *In fact, the working class remained almost entirely passive in the Chinese Revolution of 1944-49.*

How was it possible that a victorious *peasant army* carried through the overthrow of capitalism? Does this invalidate the Marxist method of analysing and understanding society?

A careful study of the material in this Supplement will help to answer these questions. It will show that, far from being invalidated by the experience of the Chinese Revolution, the method of Marxism alone proved capable of explaining the peculiar process of the revolution and its outcome, *on the basis of the new combination of forces and factors which existed after the Second World War.*

This in turn enables us to understand how and why, in a series of subsequent revolutions in the under-developed countries of the ex-colonial world, capitalism has been over-

thrown without the working class playing any decisive role in the process.

But the articles on China printed here also serve to explain and confirm the fact that the revolution in any developed, industrialised country—such as South Africa—can only be carried through if the working class succeeds in taking power, consciously overthrows capitalism, and organises the socialist transformation of society.

Transcript of speech

The first of these articles is *The Chinese Revolution, 1944-49* by Peter Taaffe. He is the editor of the weekly *Militant* newspaper, which expresses the standpoint of the Marxist tendency in the British Labour Party. The article is an edited transcript of a speech on the Chinese Revolution given in London in 1980 to a Marxist Weekend School organised by *Militant*.

The second article is *Stalinism in China* by Ted Grant, the political editor of *Militant*. It is a reprint of a section of a pamphlet entitled "Stalinism in the Post-War World", which was published in June, 1951.

In our last Supplement (No. 7), we printed Trotsky's *Summary and Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution* (1925-27), which explained how the policies of Stalinism led to the tragic defeat of the Chinese working class at that time. An understanding of the 1925-27 revolution and the causes of its defeat is a necessary background and preparation for reading the material in this Supplement.

For readers who do not have access to *Supplement No. 7*, the following short summary from its Introduction will have to suffice:

During the magnificent struggles of the Chinese workers and peasants in 1925-27, the leadership of the Communist International forced the Chinese Communist Party to subordinate itself to the bourgeois leadership of the Kuomintang nationalist movement, headed by Chiang Kai-

shek. This, they claimed, was necessary because in China the task of establishing bourgeois democracy was on the agenda.

In fact as Trotsky explained, the Chinese revolution was 'bourgeois' only in the sense that the tasks carried through by the bourgeoisie in the advanced capitalist countries in the period of the rise of capitalism—the creation of national unity; the establishment of parliamentary rule; the abolition of feudal relations on the land, etc.—had not yet been carried through in China.

But the point is that the Chinese bourgeoisie was incapable of carrying through these tasks. Weak, economically bankrupt and politically rotten, it was the instrument of foreign imperialist interests and had nothing to offer the working masses in their struggle for social emancipation.

The policy of the Communist International, based on the illusion that the Chinese bourgeoisie could lead the struggle against imperialism and serve as an ally of the Soviet regime, therefore completely disarmed and disoriented the Chinese workers' movement as to the tasks—and the dangers—that faced them. This led directly to the slaughter of the revolutionary workers of Shanghai in April 1927 at the hands of the officially-proclaimed 'revolutionary leader' Chiang Kai-shek (whom Stalin had made an honorary member of the Executive of the Communist International).

Unable to learn

But the Comintern leadership, having abandoned the method of Marxism in favour of short-sighted opportunism dictated by the interests of the Russian bureaucracy, were unable to learn the lessons of this catastrophe. They modified their policy only to the extent of instructing the Chinese CP to attach themselves to the 'Left Kuomintang', i.e. the Wuhan government led by Wang Ching-wei, which temporarily found itself in op-

position to Chiang.

Inevitably this led to fiasco, with the 'Left Kuomintang' very quickly breaking with the CP in order to come to terms with Chiang.

Stalin and the Comintern leadership now reacted by jumping from their opportunist policies to an opposite but equally disastrous ultra-left position. In December 1927, with the revolution on the ebb as a result of

their own blunders, the CP staged a futile putsch in Canton which was bloodily repressed. (This marked the beginning of Stalinism's period of ultra-leftism which continued until 1935.)

This was the final nail in the coffin of the 1925-27 revolution. Combined with the further decay of the international Communist leadership, this defeat was to have decisive con-

sequences for the further development of the revolution.

The movement of the working class was crushed for a whole period. The remnants of the CP leadership abandoned the towns for the countryside, where they succeeded in placing themselves at the head of the renewed peasant revolt that built up during the 1930s.

The Chinese Revolution (1944-49)

by Peter Taaffe

It is impossible to understand the Chinese Revolution of 1944-49 without charting, at least in broad outline, the events which followed the defeat of the revolution of 1925-27.

That earlier revolution had a proletarian character, along the lines of the Russian Revolution, whereas there was an entirely different relationship of class forces in the revolution of 1944-49. Yet in a certain sense—and it might seem a paradox—the revolution of 1944-49 was an echo of the movement of 1925-27.

What were the consequences for the Chinese people of the defeat of the revolution of 1925-27? Politically it meant the establishment of a ruthless military dictatorship that suppressed all the democratic rights of the working people, and crushed the movement of the workers and peasants.

This regime murdered at least 35 000 Communist Party members in 1927, and altogether about 50 000 people in the course of that year in the cities alone. By 1929, as a minimum estimate, 150 000 people had perished as a direct result of the repression carried out by the Kuomintang regime.

All the democratic rights—the right to strike, freedom of assembly, the right to vote—were eliminated by this regime under Chiang Kai-shek. While utterly ruthless in relation to the smallest movement of the workers and peasants, the regime at the same time was completely impotent in the face of the encroachments of imperialism on China.

In particular Japanese imperialism moved in during the period that followed the events of 1925-27 to carve out a more favourable position for itself in terms of raw materials and markets. This was necessary to satisfy the requirements of its growing manufacturing industry.

It was not at all accidental that Japanese imperialism was to the fore in the conquest and dismemberment of China. Japanese capitalism does not have any indigenous raw materials, and hungrily looked towards China's reserves of coal, oil, etc.

Also, Japanese industry has always been heavily dependent on export markets. During the world depression of 1929-33 Japan's exports of manufactured goods went down by two-thirds; half her factories were idle; and the importance of the Asian mainland as a market became crucial.

The Japanese imperialists, of course, were not alone in preying upon China. American, British and French imperialism likewise seized the opportunity that was presented by the weakness of China in the period following 1925-27 to extend their existing spheres of influence.

Japanese imperialism virtually conquered Manchuria in a number of campaigns between 1931 and 1935, establishing the stooge Manchukuo regime. British and

American imperialism joined in the dismemberment of China.

In this situation, when the national oppression of the Chinese people—as well as their national indignation against imperialism—grew tremendously, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang regime were utterly incapable of opposing the imperialist powers. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek summed up his policy as one of “non-resistance” to imperialism!

In the early 1930s the Japanese were able to advance, without meeting any serious opposition from the Kuomintang forces, to the occupation of Shanghai and other cities. Chinese generals actually supplied the occupying troops with the raw materials and oil they needed. Later in the war, too, Japanese imperialism found open collaborators in the Kuomintang regime and in its armies in particular.

During this period also, Chinese industry was more and more taken over by imperialist concerns. For instance, in 1934, British and Japanese capitalism controlled half the production of Chinese yarn.

It is against this background—on the one side the savage attacks on the conditions and the democratic rights of the working class, and on the other side the greater and greater dismemberment of China—that we have to view the role of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders in the wake of the 1925-27 revolution.

Transitional demands

At the height of the revolutionary upsurge, as Trotsky and the Left Opposition in the Communist International pointed out, the slogan of soviets (workers' councils) should have been on the agenda and part of the programme of the Chinese CP, as a preparation for taking power. Following the defeat of the 1925-27 revolution, however, when a military dictatorship exercised an iron grip over all the major cities of China, this would obviously no longer be correct.

Therefore, Trotsky put forward the idea that it was necessary now to raise a programme of *transitional demands*—on wages, on hours, on conditions, and also on all the democratic demands of the working people: the right to strike, freedom of assembly, and so on. These were to be linked to the slogan of *land to the peasants*, which could have mobilised the rural masses around the working class and the CP as the most democratic and revolutionary force in society.

The crowning slogan would be for a *revolutionary con-*



The provinces of China during the inter-War period.

stituent assembly—a parliament of the masses, in other words, to be convened by the working class in the course of the struggle against the Kuomintang.

The Chinese CP leadership, however, entirely rejected this programme. This leadership, after the resignation and subsequent expulsion of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, was in the hands of Li Li-san, who was completely obedient to Stalin and the bureaucracy in Russia. This was the 'third period' (ultra-left period) of Stalinism, when the slogan was "soviets everywhere!"—regardless of circumstances.

The CP leadership rejected democratic and transitional demands, which would have been the means of mobilising the working class and peasantry to carry through the socialist transformation of society. Instead, when workers went on strike in Shanghai, Hankow, Canton and other cities, the Communist Party called on them to organise soviets. The workers replied: "Excellencies, you are very good and talented, but please go away. All we can struggle for today is a piece of bread to feed our bellies."

To convince these workers, the general idea of the socialist revolution would have had to be linked with their day-to-day struggles against the capitalists and landlords. Instead, as a result of its insane policy, *the Communist Party completely lost its base in the industrial areas. It ceased to be a working-class party.*

This is made clear by the facts and figures provided by the Chinese CP leaders in relation to the party membership. In 1927 there were 60 000 members of the CP, and 58% of the membership was proletarian in character.

In 1928, after the murders and persecutions of the counter-revolution, the membership of the CP had apparently grown. What this really reflected, however, was the fact that the party leadership *had abandoned the cities*

and gone into the countryside. The working-class membership of the CP had shrunk to 10% of the total. In 1929 only 3% of CP members were industrial workers. By September 1930 the figure was 1.6%.

In other words, the Chinese Communist Party was no longer a proletarian party in the Marxist sense of the term.

The ex-leaders of the proletariat—the ex-leaders of the Shanghai and Canton working class in particular—had gone into the countryside following the 1925-27 debacle. To begin with, however, they did not find a big echo among the peasantry. As Mao Tse-tung himself reported subsequently, they were even attacked by the peasants, who were accustomed to armies coming across their territory and plundering them. Initially the Red detachments were assumed to be just another marauding army.

In the period that followed, a number of allegedly 'Red' armies were created in different parts of China. One of them, in Hunan, was led by Mao Tse-tung, who subsequently became the political leader of the Red Army, with Chu Teh as the military leader. This army—I haven't time to go into it—landed up in Kiangsi in the early 1930s.

Chiang Kai-shek, while utterly incapable of facing up to the attacks of imperialism, directed all his forces and energies instead against the small forces of the Reds in the predominantly peasant areas. In fact, no more brilliant pages have been written in Chinese history, than the victories that were scored between 1929 and 1934 by the Red forces against Chiang Kai-shek and the forces of the Kuomintang.

The Kuomintang armies—four, five and six times stronger—were sent against the Red forces particularly in Kiangsi province. But they were incapable of militarily dislodging the Reds by these means.

It was only after Chiang Kai-shek had assembled an army of half a million and completely surrounded the Red districts—when the Kuomintang was armed with all the resources of imperialism, including nearly 400 airplanes, while the Reds did not have a single airplane—only then was the Red Army leadership forced to decide to break out of the encirclement.

In October 1934 the Red Army began what became known as the Long March. Again, it is one of the greatest pages in the military and social history, certainly of China, and indeed of the world. The heroic detachments of the Red Army—totalling some 90 000 in the beginning, and accompanied by many thousands of peasants—undertook a march of exactly a year over an arduous route of nearly 10 000 km.

Under the direction of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, they achieved this while repeatedly engaging enemy forces vastly outnumbering their own. Eventually they found refuge in the mountain fastness of Yen-an in Shensi.

Trotsky's prognosis

In 1932, at the time when the peasant 'Red' Army was scoring brilliant victories over the Kuomintang in Kiangsi, Trotsky had posed the question of what would happen

if this army, after defeating the landlords, entered the cities.

He pointed out that the Red Army leaders were ex-workers. The Red forces were made up predominantly of peasants, ex-peasants or landless labourers, and also refugees from the various warlords. In the publications of the Communist Party itself complaints were voiced over the admission into the Red Army of the lumpen proletariat and the lumpen agricultural population.

In other words, in social composition, the Red Army was the same mixture mainly of peasants and ex-peasants that had been seen in China over thousands of years: traditional peasant armies that had arisen against oppression and exploitation by the landlords.

In posing the question of what would happen if the Red Army entered the cities, Trotsky drew on the experience of Russia. He pointed out that there, after the October Revolution, the Red Army was initially made up mainly of workers' detachments, who fought the armies of counter-revolution (known as the 'Whites') throughout the length and breadth of the country. At the same time there were peasant detachments that arose.

So long as they were fighting against the Whites there was a common cause between the Red (proletarian) Army and the various peasant armies. But once the Whites had been vanquished, *the different character of the armies came to the fore.*

The tendency of the proletariat, organised in big industry, is to collectivise industry, to plan and to organise production. The tendency of the peasantry, because it is so scattered, so stratified and so heterogeneous, is to divide up property and share out the booty.

What, asked Trotsky, if the peasant 'Red Army' in China, victorious in the countryside, were to enter the cities? Is it not possible, he said, that it would clash with the working class; that it would be hostile to the demands of the working class; and that its commanders, despite their 'Communist' label, would fuse with the capitalist class, resulting in a classical capitalist development? There were indeed many parallels in the previous two thousand years of Chinese history, when the leaders of victorious peasant armies had fused with the then ruling classes in the towns.

In a crucial respect that prognosis of Trotsky was not borne out in the Chinese Revolution of 1944-49, for, as we know, capitalism was overthrown as a result of the victory of the Red Army. Nevertheless, as I shall go on to explain, Trotsky correctly foreshadowed the main features that were evident in the revolution, on the basis of the class forces involved.

"United front"

In the 1930s, Chiang Kai-shek was so preoccupied with fighting the Reds that he abandoned the defence of China against imperialist encroachments. Eventually, even within the Kuomintang itself, and particularly within the Kuomintang armies, there was an enormous hostility growing up—firstly, to the advance of imperialism, and,

secondly, to the impotence of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang leaders in facing up to these attacks.

That culminated in 1936 when the Kuomintang general staff ordered their army in Shensi to attack the Red Army once again. There was enormous discontent; they reluctantly attacked and were defeated. As a result of that, the Kuomintang army was in a ferment of revolt.

Chiang Kai-shek, as was his wont, decided to fly to the battlefield in order to deal with the situation. While he was there, near Sian, the army rose in revolt. Chiang Kai-shek was found crouching on a mountain-side in his nightshirt!

He was brought before the Kuomintang rank-and-file, and the cry went up: "Bring the butcher of the Chinese people to a people's trial!" It showed their readiness to be rid of the bourgeois Kuomintang dictatorship and face up to the struggle against Japanese imperialism.

But, as was the case in 1925-27, once again the Chinese Communist Party leadership came to the rescue of Chiang Kai-shek. Chou En-lai, as representative of Mao Tse-tung, flew into Sian. He walked into the room where Chiang Kai-shek was held.

Let us recall that Chou En-lai had been in the headquarters of the General Labour Union in 1927 at the time of the suppression of the Shanghai working class. He had seen the butchery of Chiang Kai-shek at first hand. So Chiang turned white when Chou En-lai walked into the room at Sian! Quickly, he clicked his heels and saluted Chou as the generalissimo—as the leader—of the Chinese revolution.

In other words, the leader—the very fountainhead—of the counter-revolution was in the hands of the Reds. The troops of the Kuomintang were prepared to go over to the side of revolution.

But instead of basing themselves on this fact, what policy did the Chinese CP leadership pursue? Chou En-lai discussed "successfully" with Chiang Kai-shek for about two days, and eventually a "united front" was forged—an allegedly united front that the Communist Party had been advocating since the world Comintern Conference of 1935.

That was the conference at which the 'third period' was abandoned and Stalinism internationally swung over to *Popular Frontism*—the policy of alliance with the so-called "progressive" bourgeoisie. For this reason the Communist Party leaders in China, firmly under the control of Mao Tse-tung at this stage, were seeking a united front with the Kuomintang leadership against Japanese imperialism.

Eventually they did link up formally in a united front in 1936/37. This in turn was the moment chosen by Japanese imperialism to launch a full-blown military campaign in order to capture Chinese territory.

It is very interesting to examine in detail the process of this alleged "united front"—something which, unfortunately, there is not time to do here. But what is important about the whole experience in China in the 1930s is this: In the first phase when the Red armies went into Kiangsi, they drove out the landlords and began to carry through a land reform. But on the basis of signing this "united front" agreement with the Kuomintang—indeed as a precondition for it—a halt was called to the land reform in the Red areas.

Trotsky said at this stage that one would not rule out the possibility of co-ordinated military action against Japanese imperialism by the forces of the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the forces of the Reds. But this would be on condition that there was complete independence of the forces of the Reds and of the labour movement in China.

Moreover, as Trotsky stressed, and as the parallel experience of Russia had shown, the strongest weapon in fighting Japanese imperialism would be to carry through a social programme of land to the tillers and the factories to the proletariat.

But in China, in the "united front" period, the Reds did not do that. On the contrary, within the Red areas, land was retained by the rich peasants; and the rich peasants began more and more to creep into the ranks of the Red Army and the embryonic state machine that existed in the Red areas. Even Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung complained about this.

At the same time, in the towns that were controlled by the Reds there was a similar situation to that which had occurred as a result of CP policy in Shanghai and Canton during the 1925-27 revolution: class collaboration with the capitalists; a deliberate attempt to restrict the movement of the working class; the workers were not to ask for more than the capitalists were prepared to give; and so on.

But the most important feature of this so-called united front with the Kuomintang was that, in the course of the war itself, the Kuomintang was utterly incapable of resisting the advance of the Japanese forces. The Kuomintang forces retreated to the central and western parts of China.

The only force that really fought Japanese imperialism was the Red Army.

The programme of Japanese imperialism in the countryside of China was summed up in the horrific slogan of the *Three Alls*—"Loot all, burn all, and kill all." Through this absolute ruthlessness, the peasants were driven into the ranks of the Red Army.

Thus the end result was that Japanese imperialism merely held the major industrial areas and a narrow strip of land along the railways. Already in the early part of the war, much of the rest of China came under the influence of the Red Army and its leadership.

Already in the Red areas we saw the embryo of a state machine. In 1945, for instance, at the end of the Second World War, the area that was controlled by the Reds had a population of about 90 million. The embryonic state power of the Reds was such that they even produced their own currency.

The Kuomintang fought only an occasional engagement against the Japanese. The calculation of Chiang Kai-shek was that he would keep his forces in the west so that, as soon as Japanese imperialism was defeated in the World War by American imperialism, he would occupy the eastern seaboard of China once again.

He expected then that there would be a repetition of the events of 1925-27, and the capitulation of the Chinese CP leadership. This did not happen, for reasons I will go into in a moment.

It is important to emphasise that most of the energies of the Kuomintang during the war were directed against the Reds whenever it was possible to do so. In 1941-42,

for example, when the Red Army was attempting to engage the Japanese in combat, in the course of the crossing of a number of rivers the Kuomintang treacherously attacked the forces of the Reds.

This was in complete violation of the so-called "united front" against Japanese imperialism which had been agreed.

Outcome of the War

Eventually, as we know, Japanese imperialism was defeated in the course of the Second World War, capitulating in 1945 after the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Then Chiang Kai-shek was faced with an enormous dilemma.

First of all, the Russian Stalinist bureaucracy intervened in Manchuria, and occupied practically the whole of it in a nine-day war. It was obvious that Stalin was even considering the establishment there of a puppet regime.

Li Li-san (whom I mentioned before as a stooge of Stalin) had been removed from the Chinese CP leadership in 1930 and had remained in Moscow after that. Now he was brought back on the heels of Stalin's troops as part of a half-hearted attempt by the bureaucracy in Russia to establish their position in Manchuria.

Manchuria actually contained most of Chinese industry at that particular stage. When the Stalinist bureaucracy occupied Manchuria, they proceeded—in the same hooligan fashion as they did in Germany—to strip the whole area of its factories, of its technical expertise, and transported it back to Russia.

This was in complete contradiction to all the principles of internationalism that Lenin and the Bolsheviks had established in 1917. The narrow, nationalist, bureaucratic concepts of Stalinism resulted in the looting of Manchuria.

The Red Army having penetrated Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek was flown in by the Americans from the western areas that he occupied. Chiang now found himself in the position that Japanese imperialism had been in previously. He had the towns and some parts of the railways—those parts of the railways that the peasants had not ripped up. (In a very famous tradition of Chinese peasant resistance, they bent the rails to make them unusable.)

Chiang Kai-shek then had to think about importing his troops and equipment into northern China and Manchuria by sea, with the aid of American imperialism. In all, he was in a very difficult strategic position.

But at the end of the Second World War, there was tremendous pressure on the Chinese Red Army, which was predominantly a peasant force, to come to an agreement once again with Chiang Kai-shek. In 1945 there was considerable war-weariness, and in that year the Red Army leaders decided once more to negotiate with the Kuomintang.

I mentioned before that Trotsky had expected that, when the Red Army entered the cities, the leaders might fuse with the capitalist class, with the result that a classical capitalist development would take place. But let us recall

that, by the end of the Second World War, two decades had elapsed since the 1925-27 revolution and the capitulation at that time of the Chinese CP leaders to the Kuomintang bourgeoisie.

Now Chinese society was completely in an impasse. Landlordism and capitalism had had the opportunity in those two decades to solve the problems of Chinese society, and had been found wanting. Chinese capitalism was incapable of tackling the land problem; incapable of unifying China; impotent against imperialism; incapable of stopping the blood-letting and the suffering of the Chinese people.

To take just one example of the terrible bankruptcy of the capitalist system in China—the rate of inflation in one year after the Second World War was 10 000%! Money became completely worthless. The whole of Chinese society was completely disorganised.

Moreover, during the period of the Kuomintang dictatorship, as a minimum estimate one million people had perished in China as a direct result of the monstrous repressive measures of this regime. That is apart from the slaughter carried out by Japanese imperialism.

Nevertheless, at the end of the war there was pressure, on account of war-weariness, for the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to collaborate. Some Marxists in the West—alleged Marxists, that is—said: “Ah, look! Mao Tse-tung is attempting to capitulate to Chiang Kai-shek.”

But was this the case? It was correct, in fact, for the Red Army leadership to negotiate with the Kuomintang at that stage. This was necessary in order to make it clear to the masses that the Reds were not the ones who should be held responsible for continuing the war, but that they were in favour of peace.

And what was the programme that Mao Tse-tung put forward at this point? It is very interesting to examine this programme:

**Punish war criminals.* Who were the war criminals? Mostly the tops of the Kuomintang—who, by the way, in Manchuria, had taken over and absorbed into the Kuomintang armies all the collaborators with Japanese imperialism. The war criminals were the leadership of the Kuomintang.

**Abrogate the bogus constitution*—on which the Kuomintang rested.

**Abolish the pretended legitimacy of the Kuomintang power.* This meant that the Kuomintang leaders were no longer to be considered the legitimate holders of political power.

**Reform all reactionary armies in accordance with democratic principles*—a devastating blow against the Kuomintang officer caste and ruling clique.

**Confiscate bureaucratic capital.* That was, in effect, a pseudonym for “Take over capitalism”—nationalise the capital that was controlled by imperialism and by the tops of the Kuomintang and their supporters.

**Reform the agrarian system.*

**Abrogate treaties of national betrayal.*

**Convoke a consultative conference without the participation of reactionary elements.*

It was absolutely impossible for the Kuomintang leadership to enter into an agreement with the Red Army on any of these measures—measures so obviously necessary and acceptable to the mass of the Chinese peo-

ple. There followed a short inter-regnum in which American imperialism tried to exert pressure for a coalition. That was not successful, and in turn resulted in the resumption of the war in 1946.

Really the *civil war* in China took place between 1946 and 1949. In a whole series of battles the forces of the Kuomintang were smashed. In Manchuria, they were surrounded in the cities, which eventually fell. Then the Red Army moved into the central and eastern provinces.

Social situation

If we look at the combination of factors that existed in Chinese society at that stage, it was obvious that the situation was not as Trotsky had anticipated in the period before the Second World War. The impotence and bankruptcy of landlordism and capitalism—its utter inability to show a way forward for Chinese society—had by now gone much further than could have been foreseen.

It would be wrong to think that it was military superiority which guaranteed the victories of the Red Army in the clashes that took place in the Chinese civil war. On the contrary, the Kuomintang had overwhelming superiority in military terms. There were roughly one million troops in the Kuomintang armies, and they were armed with the very latest in weapons and technique by American imperialism.

What happened is that, in every battle which took place, the Kuomintang *was defeated by the revolutionary propaganda of the Red Army—in particular by the call of “land to the tillers!”*

Under the impetus of the mass movement that developed in 1947, Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese CP leadership had been forced to adopt a much more radical land programme than had existed in the Red areas during the earlier “united front” period. As a result, the propaganda of the Red Army was like tanks going through the lines of the Kuomintang armies.

When they defeated an army of the Kuomintang, the Reds did not take the troops prisoner. They released the Kuomintang troops—and imbued them with the idea that the Reds wanted them to take over the land and smash the landlord and capitalist exploiters.

That was more successful than airplanes, bullets and all the latest word in armaments in disintegrating the Kuomintang armies. Eventually it resulted in the total collapse of the Kuomintang in 1947-48.

But even as late as 1948 there were alleged “Marxists”, alleged “Trotskyists”, who were insisting that Mao Tse-tung was attempting to capitulate to Chiang Kai-shek! As one wag in America said, “If that is true, the problem is he can’t catch him”—because, in fact, Chiang and his forces were running away from the forces of the Reds, from the north of China right down the eastern seaboard to the southern coast itself.

Another claim that was put forward, by the allegedly “Trotskyist” SWP in America, was that Mao Tse-tung would never cross the Yangtze River. However, on the day that they published this in their paper, Mao was

already 60 km beyond the Yangtze.

They were operating with all the old *formulas* that Trotsky had worked out in the inter-war period—but *they were incapable of understanding Trotsky's method and of relating his ideas to the changing situation, and the new combination of factors and forces that had arisen in the period 1944-49.*

Chinese landlordism and capitalism was utterly impotent to develop society any further. A vacuum existed in Chinese society. Japanese imperialism had been defeated and could not intervene. American imperialism itself was not able to intervene directly.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, throughout the whole of Asia there were massive movements of American troops wanting to go home. The famous "Bring the Boys Home" movement developed throughout the West.

So American imperialism could supply Chiang Kai-shek with the latest armaments (which by the way, were subsequently captured by the Reds and used not only in China, but also against American imperialism in Korea), but they were not able to bolster up the armies of the Kuomintang with troops. They could not stop the disintegrating effects on the Kuomintang armies caused by the social situation that existed in China at that time.

The incapacity of imperialism to intervene was summed up in one famous—or infamous—incident (depending on your point of view). That was the "Amethyst" incident.

Let us remember that in Shanghai and Canton, at the time of the 1925-27 revolution, the British imperialists brazenly shot down Chinese workers and peasants. Yet in 1949 when the British warship *Amethyst* managed to sneak down the Yangtze River, evade the Red gun-boats, and escape, that was hailed as a "great victory" in the British press. That was a graphic illustration of the impotence of imperialism to intervene against the Chinese revolution.

The power vacuum that existed in China was more important in determining the outcome of the revolution than all the speeches of Mao Tse-tung, when he said, for instance, that national capitalism in China would last a hundred years.

Understanding this enabled the Marxist tendency, which today is gathered round the *Militant* newspaper (and we trace our antecedents right back to that period), to grasp correctly the process of the revolution that was taking place in China.

The Marxists of the Militant Tendency argued that the development would not be as Trotsky had anticipated in the inter-war period. Certainly it would not be a conscious movement of the proletariat like the October Revolution in Russia in 1917. It would be a peasant army entering the cities, as Trotsky clearly foresaw. But instead of the commanders of the peasant army fusing with the capitalist class and a capitalist development taking place, it was now inevitable that capitalism would be overthrown.

This was because of the exhaustion and bankruptcy of Chinese capitalism; because of the weakness of imperialism on a world scale in the aftermath of the Second World War; because of the greatly increased strength of Stalinism as a result of the Second World War, in Russia and Eastern Europe; because, also, Mao Tse-tung and

the leaders of the Red Army had a model of the kind of state and the kind of society that they could confidently move to create in China.

But while, therefore, the outcome of the revolution would not be as Trotsky had expected in the inter-war period, by no stretch of the imagination could Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese CP and Red Army leaders be considered *communists*, in the classical sense of the term.

They were not Marxists in the sense that they did not base themselves on the proletariat—which is absolutely fundamental to the Marxist approach, method, strategy and tactics. On the contrary, they were deadly fearful of the movement of the proletariat and of any action by the workers which they could not directly control.

The Chinese CP leaders were Bonapartist leaders, resting on the peasant Red Army, and manoeuvring in order to gather absolute power over society into their own hands. From the outset the model for their regime was the Stalinist dictatorship in Russia, which had arisen out of the *degeneration* of the Russian Revolution. Mao



This map, published in the New York Herald Tribune in January 1949, showed the area of China then under the control of the Red Army.

began at the point which Stalin had already reached.

This was the explanation and analysis put forward by the Marxists of the Militant Tendency *at the time of the Chinese Revolution itself*. It was explained that, like Stalin, Mao would balance between the classes while consolidating his regime, and in the process ruthlessly suppress all independent actions and initiatives by the workers.

As in Russia, so in China capitalism was eliminated and a nationalised and planned economy introduced. But while the Russian workers' state began on healthy lines of workers' democracy and subsequently degenerated, the state established in China by the Red Army was a deformed workers' state, a Stalinist state from the outset.

International effects

The difference between the Russian and Chinese revolutions was enormous also in the different international repercussions which they produced. The October Revolution in Russia inspired tremendous movements of the working class throughout the world. An example was the revolutionary events in Italy, in 1920, where the workers occupied the factories.

An indication of the way that the proletariat internationally identified with the Russian Revolution was, paradoxically, indicated by the barrage of propaganda put up by the capitalist press at the time. The propaganda against the Russian Revolution put in the shade the lies and filth that we encounter in the *Daily Express*, for instance, today.

To give one humorous example: the *New York Times* carried over a hundred articles between 1918 and 1921 which said either that Trotsky had bumped off Lenin, or that Lenin had bumped off Trotsky! One headline was "Trotsky Assassinates Lenin in Drunken Brawl"! Now, if that was in a serious journal such as the *New York Times*, imagine the kind of stories that would appear in the yellow press.

But despite the propaganda, the working class internationally instinctively knew that their class was in power, and it inspired them.

In Russia there had been democratic organs of control and management in the form of the soviets. Nothing of this character existed in China between 1946-49 or in the aftermath.

In the main, in the big cities, "...Political apathy and inertia were stronger even than universal dissatisfaction ...the revolution finally engulfed Peking, but it was full-grown and did not grow gradually within the City itself." (*Communist China on the Eve of Takeover* by A. Doak Bennet, p. 325.)

Furthermore, the Stalinist leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and Red Army displayed the fear of the 'full-grown' *bureaucracy* towards any independent movement by the working class. In their eight-point peace programme, presented as a manoeuvre before they occupied Peking, they unashamedly warned the working class: "Those who strike or destroy will be punished ... those

working in these organisations (factories) should work peacefully and wait for the takeover."

And true to their word, any independent action by the working class was met with ruthless repression. Contrast this attitude with that shown by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution. The Bolsheviks looked towards the working class as the *main* agent of change and urged: "*the land to the tillers and the factories to the producers.*"

Without any question, the Chinese revolution of 1944-49 was one of the greatest events in human history. It was the second greatest event, surpassed only by the October Revolution of 1917.

One quarter of mankind stepped onto the stage of history, and put behind them once and forever the disease, the ravages, the misery that landlordism and capitalism had meant for them.

The Chinese revolution inspired and gave a push to the colonial revolution in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was an event of great historical importance, but at the same time an event that could not have the same effect as the Russian Revolution on the working class internationally.

It established a planned economy, as most of industry was gradually taken over by the state, and a thorough-going land reform was carried through. But at the same time there was the establishment of a one-party totalitarian regime.

The idea that there was a democracy in China in 1949 is a fairy-tale, for the consumption of children of 10 or younger.

Now, if we look at the situation in China at that particular stage, we see that Mao Tse-tung formed a "coalition" with the Kuomintang. To be more exact, he formed a coalition with the "People's Kuomintang"—supposedly representing the 'national' capitalists—which had a total membership of a few hundred. Not exactly a mighty force, in a population of three-quarters of a billion.

On the surface what Mao Tse-tung had done coincided with a phrase that Trotsky had used in the 1930s in relation to Spain. This is where a lot of "Trotskyists", who used only the phrases of Trotsky without grasping his meaning, made hopeless mistakes in relation to China.

Trotsky said that in Spain the Stalinist CP had formed a coalition, not with the capitalist class, but with their *shadow*. What he meant by this was that the capitalists in reality had all fled to the side of General Franco and the counter-revolution; and the workers' leaders had formed a coalition with the ex-representatives of the capitalists in Spain.

This was the 'Popular Front' which served to hold the working class back from taking state power, and thus preserved capitalism in Spain. Gradually the "shadow" got substance, and the workers' movement in Republican Spain was smashed.

On the face of it, in China, Mao Tse-tung had entered into a coalition with the shadow of the capitalist class. *But there was a crucial difference in China at this time, as opposed to Spain in 1936-39. The real levers of state power were not in the hands of the bourgeois partners of the Red Army, in the so-called People's Kuomintang. They were entirely in the hands of Mao Tse-tung, the Red Army and the so-called Communist Party—particularly*

the police, the military, and so on.

The "coalition" with the capitalist People's Kuomintang counted for nothing against the enormous objective pressures forcing the regime to move to eliminate capitalism and take the economy into state hands. Therefore we had in China the development of a totalitarian one-party regime based on a *progressive* economic system—a planned economy.

Only by understanding the relationship of forces in the Chinese Revolution is it possible to grasp the very complex processes that are taking place in Asia, Africa and Latin America at the present time. The processes are not according to any schema laid down in advance by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky—yet only the *method* developed by these great teachers in their time enables us to understand what is taking place.

We can understand the processes if all the comrades gain a fuller grasp of the features of the Chinese revolution of 1944-49, and the way in which that revolution developed.

It was not a case of the working class playing the main role in the revolution, but of a victorious peasant army entering the cities. It was a case of a Bonapartist regime which established a planned economy—which in that sense *historically* expressed the material interests of the working class.

But in no sense was it a regime of workers' democracy along the lines of the Bolshevik regime in Russia in 1917. It was not—and is not—a socialist regime moving towards the development of socialist society. That is impossible unless power is in the hands of the working class, and a regime of workers' democracy prevails.

Unfortunately, because of the way the regime developed in China, the Chinese working class will have to pay with a new revolution—this time a *political revolution*—establishing workers' democracy on the foundations of the planned economy. Only then will the way be clear for Chinese society to move towards socialism in the context of a world socialist federation.

Stalinism in China

by Ted Grant

Editor's note:

The following passages were written in June, 1951, summing up the conclusions of Marxism that had been drawn in the course of the Chinese Revolution of 1944-49. More than 30 years later, it would scarcely be necessary to alter a single sentence in order to bring the analysis up to date.

Written during Mao's 'coalition' with the Chinese 'national' capitalists, it correctly forecast that the regime would move to take their businesses and industries into state ownership. That began, in fact, in 1952.

Despite the fact that the Chinese and Soviet governments had signed, in February 1950, a thirty-year treaty "of friendship, alliance and mutual aid", the article anticipated—and explained in advance—the Sino-Soviet split. That split

became manifest in 1957-58, and really acute from the early 1960s.

The Chinese bureaucracy's turn in foreign policy towards an accommodation with American imperialism—something which was generally regarded as a bombshell when it occurred in 1971 during Nixon's presidency—was clearly forecast as a future probability in this article in 1951.

The ability of a Marxist perspective to foresee the course of events is not based on "crystal-ball-gazing", but on a meticulous and many-sided analysis of the class forces in society, the material interests of the participants, and the material processes at work. It burrows beneath the superficial claims and labels worn by political organisations and leaders to discover the real pressures and factors which will determine their actions. That alone enables the Marxist method, its conclusions and perspectives, to stand

the test of time.

This article is perhaps above all noteworthy for the clarity with which it drew the conclusion that Mao's regime would eliminate capitalism—while not giving one millimetre to the idea that therefore Mao could be considered a 'Marxist' or 'communist'. On the contrary, it spelled out in broad outline the inevitable entrenchment of a bureaucratic dictatorship in China, with the Maoist regime becoming more and more elevated above society, zig-zagging in policy, becoming more and more corrupt, and requiring eventual overthrow by the working class to clear the road to workers' democracy and socialism in China, in conjunction with the socialist revolution in the West.

The post-revolutionary history of the Chinese Stalinist regime, and present perspectives for China, will have to be taken up in future issues of INQABA.

The peculiar combination of forces which resulted in the victory of Stalinism in Eastern Europe, are working towards the same results in Asia. In China we have an outstanding example of this result of the multiplicity of historical factors. The defeat of the revolution of 1925/27 (due to the mistakes of the Stalinists) which had had every promise of success, led the Stalinist leadership and the cadres they had managed to retain, to desert the cities and take to the mountains in order to base themselves on the Peasant War, ...a war which had many precedents in China's long history.

Weakness of Imperialism

The crumbling and decay of the capitalist-landlord military police regime was shown in its total incapacity to solve a single one of China's problems in the period 1927/1945. Far more rotten than Czarist Russia, even at its worst, it succeeded in alienating almost the entire population apart from the tiny clique of Chiang Kai-shek at the top. There were none really willing to strike a blow in its defence at the hour of danger. In the same period the frightful decay of Imperialism following the Second World War made the Imperialists incapable of interven-

ing. In 1925/27 British Imperialism had replied to "an insult to the Flag" by bombarding the main ports of China with their warships. This with the approval of the Labour and Trade Union leaders. In 1949 such was the relationship of forces, the Imperialists hailed with glee the sneaking away of the warship Amethyst from the waters of the Yangtze! So has the relationship of forces changed. The American Imperialists intervened with huge supplies of arms, money and munitions, to aid the corrupt gang of Chiang Kai-shek—almost invariably the supplies falling into the hands of the Chinese Red Army.

These factors, together with the fact that they had mighty Russia as a neighbour, all had their impact on the development of the situation in China. Under "normal" conditions, the Peasant War in China would have ended as all such wars have ended in the past, or the leadership of the Chinese peasants would have fused with the capitalist elements in the cities, and the peasant masses would have found themselves betrayed. The revolution would have assumed a capitalist character.

However, all the factors enumerated above, had to have a different result than could have been foreseen in advance. Without Russia as a neighbour, without the degeneration of the Russian regime as a further factor, without the complete breakdown of the regime in China,

where the old ruling class had so pitifully outlived itself, without the degeneration of the international Stalinist movement, without the extreme weakness of the genuine Marxist current, without the weakness of Imperialism on a world scale, events in China, as in all Asia, would have taken a different turn: either in the direction of a proletarian revolution according to the norm (with all its international implications in the spreading of the revolution to Europe and the World) or the victory of capitalist counter-revolution. Those would have been the alternatives.

History, however, is full of inexhaustible variants which cannot be foreseen in advance. Theory is grey, but the tree of life is green... All these complicated factors in combination have resulted in the revolution being accomplished in a different way than theory had previously indicated. Using the same technique as in Yugoslavia, with the mass movement of the peasants as their base, Mao and the Chinese Red Army (with possibly an even more popular and greater mass base than Tito had)... waged a revolutionary war for the land. The armies of the Kuomintang clique melted away. Here was a peasant war in the classical revolutionary tradition. The Bonapartist clique of Stalinism based itself firmly on the longing of the peasantry for the land. Leading the peasant war they gained the powerful support of the masses. Here we have a peculiar variant of the permanent revolution. Because of the incapacity of the peasantry to play an independent role they have been organised and led by the ex-Marxists.

Mao's Peasant Army Base

Due to the crisis of the regime and the paralysis of the movement in the cities by Stalinism, Mao Tse-tung and the other Stalinist leaders established an independent base in the peasant army; classical instrument of Bonapartism. But in line with the epoch and the various factors already exhaustively dealt with, it could not end as normally a peasant war independent of the mass movement in the cities would end. Having conquered the cities, with at least passive acquiescence of the working class and petty bourgeois masses in the cities, Mao Tse-tung and his group could succeed in Bonapartist fashion in balancing between the classes. Starting with the gradual elimination of the landlords throughout the territory which they had conquered (after the initial stages of the movement, the bureaucracy was concerned not to have any independent movement of either the peasants or the workers which could not be directly harnessed and controlled by themselves) and immediately confiscating what they termed "bureaucratic capitalism", i.e., the key centres of whatever heavy industry and finance existed, the bonapartist bureaucracy could manoeuvre between the classes. For a temporary period and in order to help consolidate the rise and control of a bureaucratic caste, they have tolerated merchant and industrial capitalism in a neo-NEP.

Manoeuvring between the classes, they will establish a firm and strong state machine. Basing themselves now on the peasants, now on the workers, then on the

bourgeoisie, to serve different ends they will balance between them as "arbiter" and regulator of private ownership in industry and then at a later stage, to the expropriation of the peasantry as well, on the model of Russia and Eastern Europe. Because of the weakness and impotence of the bourgeoisie, with no historical perspective and no historical mission to perform, it will be eliminated with comparative ease. Mao will base himself on the workers in order to strike blows at the bourgeoisie, as Stalin did at the time of the elimination of the Kulaks and the NEP men.

Chinese Stalinism Firmly in Control

A Stalinist bureaucracy cannot tolerate the sharing of power with the bourgeoisie because this would weaken it and reduce it to a subordinate puppet role, with the corresponding diminution of its income, power and privileges. The peasants, incapable of finding a different road, will be mercilessly repressed. Gradually a totalitarian state, more and more approximating to that of Moscow, will be established. Having based themselves on the workers for a time in order to eliminate the capitalists and consolidate their rule, they must turn on the working class and smash any elements of workers' democracy which may exist or be developed in the process.

Before Stalinism in China is a long perspective of power despite the social convulsions and crises of growth and consolidation. It is relatively progressive because of the development of industry and the unification of China for the first time, and on this basis giving a tremendous impulse to the development of the productive forces. Purely on the basis of Chinese conditions they can maintain their rule for a long time. They will consolidate themselves more and more firmly in control in the next period. Factors making for this have been the endless war and civil war in which China has been involved in the last two decades, the weariness of the people who demand peace, the relatively progressive role they play in China, and the lack of any alternative on the Chinese basis alone. All these factors strengthen powerfully the role of Chinese Stalinism.

Long Historical Perspective

Of course, events in China can be hastened or retarded by developments in Western Europe, America and Russia. These remain the decisive areas of the world. A successful proletarian revolution in the West producing a workers' state on the Marxist norm, would, of course, result in a revival of the revolution in China and open the road for a healthy development by hastening the political revolution. But taking Chinese forces as a basis, it is clear that Mao, like Stalin, will develop the forces which will overthrow his machine in the future.

The relatively austere administration, without control from the masses, will become more and more corrupt. State power is a powerful source of infection and disease. Increasing their separation from the masses, the bureaucratic caste will raise themselves higher and higher

above the people as a new aristocracy and will provoke the sharp hatred of the masses.

New Revolution Inevitable

Because of the history of China, its traditions and its terrible backwardness, Chinese Stalinism on its own forces alone will inevitably develop an even more monstrous oppressive machine than that of Stalinism in Russia. The bureaucratic caste which is crystallising there will only be removed by force. The new political revolution and the establishment of a healthy workers' democracy, but on a higher industrial foundation, and in the long run the fate of China, as of all the East, will

be determined by the fate of the revolution in Western Europe and America.

Having an independent base, the regime of Mao Tse-tung will most likely come into conflict with that of the Stalinist bureaucracy in Russia. Reluctantly, after the experience of Yugoslavia, the bureaucracy has been compelled to treat the People's Republic of China as a junior partner rather than an out-and-out satellite or a Moscow province. Despite the efforts to avoid this, at a later stage if favourable terms can be obtained from Britain and America, it is quite likely that Mao Tse-tung will break away and play an independent role. Thus, in that sense, once an independent basis is established, it is difficult if not impossible, for Moscow to maintain direct rule or domination.

Explanatory Notes

Bolsheviks—Revolutionary wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, organised in opposition to the Mensheviks, or reformist wing. The Bolsheviks became a separate party only in 1912. Under the guidance of Lenin and Trotsky, the Bolsheviks led the working class in taking power in October 1917.

Bonapartism—Term used by Marxists for a dictatorial regime which balances between the contending classes, while raising itself above society as a whole. The term derives from the example of Napoleon Bonaparte's dictatorship in France in 1799.

In the last analysis, in the modern world, a Bonapartist regime must defend one or other of two systems of property and economic order. Either it defends private property, which is the basis of capitalism, or it defends state ownership of the means of production, which is the basis of a planned economy.

In the first case, we call it 'Bourgeois Bonapartism'. In the second case, we call it 'Proletarian Bonapartism', because its economic foundation is the system of property historically appropriate to the rule of the working class.

But just as a Bourgeois Bonapartist regime is not *directly* a government of the capitalists, neither is a Proletarian Bonapartist regime one in which the workers rule.

Comintern—Short name for the Communist (Third) International, founded in 1919 on the initiative of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), after the victory of the October Revolution. The Comintern was initially a powerful attraction to the international working-class movement, and by 1921 had 887 000 members.

But the defeat of a series of revolutions in Europe led to the isolation and degeneration of the Russian Revolution. With the resulting rise of Stalinism, the Russian CP was transformed, step by step, into the instrument of dictatorship by a privileged bureaucracy.

Through the predominance of the Russian CP leadership in the Comintern, the latter, too, underwent Stalinist degeneration. Ultimately all the Communist Parties were turned into obedient followers of the dictates of the bureaucracy in Moscow. Each twist and turn of Stalin's

policy was immediately adopted in the Comintern and slavishly adhered to by the various national CPs.

The degeneration of the Russian CP and of the Comintern was vigorously resisted by the remaining cadres of Bolshevism, who organised themselves as the **Left Opposition** with Trotsky's leadership. But, by means of ruthless expulsions, deportations, the suppression of debate, and the physical liquidation of tens of thousands of revolutionaries, the Stalinist apparatus gained an iron grip on the Party and the International.

The forces of the Left Opposition remained oriented to the CPs and the Comintern until 1933, when it was clear that these bodies could never be regenerated.

In 1943, Stalin peremptorily dissolved the Comintern, as a gesture of assurance to his imperialist Allies in the Second World War that the Communist Parties had abandoned their former aims of world revolution.

Kulak—Literally "fist". Russian nickname for a rich peasant.

Kuomintang—Literally "People's Party", this was the Chinese nationalist organisation founded in 1911 by Sun Yat Sen. It looked for support to the peasantry, urban middle class and workers, but its leadership was in bourgeois hands.

In the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, played the main counter-revolutionary role as butcher of the working class.

After the eventual defeat of the Kuomintang by the Chinese Red Army in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek took refuge on the island of Formosa (Taiwan), where he established his dictatorship under the protection of American imperialism—and where his successors rule to this day.

NEP—"New Economic Policy." An economic retreat which was forced on the Bolshevik government in Russia as a result of the dreadful destruction of the economy caused by the civil war and the intervention of the armies of imperialism.

For the overwhelmingly peasant population of the Soviet Union, Lenin and Trotsky had advocated a programme

of gradual collectivisation of agriculture, by the example of voluntary model collectives established with the aid of industrial development and the provision of tractors.

However, to overcome extreme food shortages in 1920-21, concessions had to be given to peasants to encourage production for private profit (the NEP). This had been intended by Lenin as a temporary retreat.

But the emerging Stalinist bureaucracy perverted the NEP, against the warnings of the Left Opposition, and blithely encouraged the kulaks to "enrich yourselves".

Then, panicking that he had created a social base for his own overthrow and the restoration of capitalism, Stalin and his henchmen switched in 1929 to an extreme policy of forced collectivisation of agriculture and "liquidation of the kulaks"—on the basis of the existing primitive plough. The peasants resisted, destroying livestock and crops; in the ensuing famine 10 million died.

Peking—Chinese capital city (indicated as Peiping on the old maps, and as Beijing on maps today).

Russian Revolution, 1917—The first (and, so far, the only) victorious workers' revolution in history.

Soviets—Elected councils of workers' delegates from the factories and districts. First created on the initiative of organised workers in Petrograd (now Leningrad) during the Russian revolution of 1905, the soviets provided a non-party representative body which could readily gain authority in the eyes of the masses, and serve as instruments of working-class power.

Soviets sprang up again at the outset of the Russian revolution of 1917, when the Tsar was overthrown. During the course of this revolution, the Bolsheviks won a majority in the key soviets and, in October, led the working class in the struggle to take power on the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!"

Although the name 'Soviet Union' is still used to describe Russia, in fact all vestiges of soviet power have been eliminated as a result of the Stalinist counter-revolution.

Spanish Revolution, 1931-37—For a study of this revolution and the causes of its defeat, see *INQABA Supplement No. 6*.

Stalinism—Term to describe the social phenomenon of (and the policies pursued by) a ruling bureaucracy which establishes itself on the basis of state ownership of the means of production. (See explanation of Proletarian Bonapartism above.)

The first historical example of this was the rise of the bureaucracy in Russia, notably from 1923 onwards, when the exhausted working class had been unable to sustain its hold on state power and the revolution degenerated.

The head of the bureaucratic counter-revolution was Stalin, who eventually became an absolute dictator. Hence the term "Stalinism".

Tito—Leader of the Yugoslav Communist Party which organised the partisan guerilla resistance against Nazi German

occupation during the Second World War. The support of the population as a result of this gave Tito a basis of independence from Moscow.

The partisans assisted the Soviet Red Army in driving the German forces out of Yugoslavia. The CP gained power towards the end of the Second World War, and, carrying through the elimination of capitalism, established a regime on Stalinist lines.

Tito's relative independence was in contrast to the countries of Eastern Europe where, following the victory of the Soviet Red Army against Hitler, regimes completely obedient to Stalin were set up.

The simmering conflict between the Russian and Yugoslav bureaucracies reached the point of an open split by 1948, with Tito being denounced as an "imperialist spy" and even a "fascist" in the Russian press.

Trotsky—Born 1879. Together with Lenin, leader of the Russian Revolution of October 1917; organiser of the Red Ar-

my and its leader in the civil war and the successful defence of the country against 21 invading armies of imperialism.

Trotsky was deposed from the Soviet leadership after Lenin's death, in the course of the bureaucratic counter-revolution which set in. The leader of the Bolshevik Left Opposition against Stalinism, he was expelled from the Communist Party and banished to a remote rural area in 1928; then deported from the Soviet Union in 1929; and eventually murdered by an agent of Stalin, in Mexico, in 1940.

Wuhan government—In 1927 there were two rival Kuomintang governments, one in Nanking under Chiang Kai-shek, and one in Wuhan under Wang Ching-wei.

Wang, the leader of the so-called "Left" Kuomintang, nevertheless followed Chiang's example in attacking the Chinese CP and trade unions in July 1927.

Later Wang went over to open collaboration with Japanese imperialism.